History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice models in corporate governance by Marnet, Oliver
Aberystwyth University
History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice models in corporate
governance
Marnet, Oliver
Published in:
Critical Perspectives on Accounting
DOI:
10.1016/j.cpa.2005.11.010
Publication date:
2007
Citation for published version (APA):
Marnet, O. (2007). History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice models in corporate governance. Critical
Perspectives on Accounting, 18(2), 191-210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpa.2005.11.010
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Aberystwyth Research Portal (the Institutional Repository) are
retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the
legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Aberystwyth Research Portal for the purpose of private study or
research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Aberystwyth Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
tel: +44 1970 62 2400
email: is@aber.ac.uk
Download date: 18. Apr. 2020
Critical Perspectives on Accounting 18 (2007) 191–210
History repeats itself: The failure of rational choice
models in corporate governance
Oliver Marnet ∗
Department of Economics and International Development, University of Bath,
Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom
Received 3 July 2005; accepted 30 November 2005
Abstract
Conventional proposals to reform corporate governance based on the rational model of decision
making may be insufficient in preventing future corporate debacles. Typically underestimated are the
pressures from conflicts of interest and bias on reputational intermediaries. Judgements and choices
made by auditors during professional engagements may not strictly adhere to the rational model of
decision making. This is of significance with regard to the gatekeeper function of auditors and relevant
legislation. A discussion on earnings management elaborates by suggesting that strictly numerical
measures are not a reliable guide to the quality of corporate governance. It is suggested that our
understanding of monitor behaviour in corporate governance would be improved by placing it on
psychologically more realistic foundations. Some of these foundations are introduced.
© 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This essay is concerned about the apparent ease with which existing systems of corporate
governance can be undermined. We ask whether reforms based on the standard monitoring
model of corporate governance are sufficient to prevent corporate scandals from occurring
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in the future. Or are these reforms little more than cosmetic sticky plaster to give the
appearance of having righted the corporate ship whilst leaving it still fundamentally flawed?
The somewhat pessimistic conclusion we reach is that they are insufficient. It seems inherent
in human nature to gamble imprudently, to cheat and to lie in order to give the appearance
of being able to reach unattainable goals, or to cover up the fact that some were missed.
Thus, whilst the mavericks of the corporate world may need a few years to find their way
through the new rules, once they do, further scandals are inevitable.
During the second half of the 1990s, exceptionally bright people ran exceptionally
successful companies, or so it appeared, and helped create exorbitant expectations amongst
investors. For a short while this induced an atmosphere that indicated the suspension of
economic laws on risk and return. However, increasingly aggressive financial reporting
could maintain the mirage of ever increasing earnings only for so long. The subsequent
deluge of corporate collapses tarnished the reputation of the corporate system and that of
the monitoring system designed to prevent fraud (Coffee, 2003a; Clarke et al., 2003).
Enron was the biggest corporate scandal and one of the biggest corporate collapses in
history. Even more worrying was that this was quickly followed by aftershocks of equal
magnitude such as WorldCom, Parmalat and the collapse of Germany’s Neuer Markt, reveal-
ing something rotten in the state of the corporate world.1 These scandals, predictably, led to
a great deal of soul searching by policy makers, commentators, accountants and academics
on both sides of the Atlantic. One result of this has been the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
in the United States and various legislative and regulatory efforts in Europe and elsewhere
aimed at preventing a repeat of such debacles.2
Corporate scandals typically lead to changes in legislation.3 Generally, what are seen as
specific and/or unique causes of a scandal are met with specific changes to particular rules,
laws and codes of best practice. That is, technical fixes are sought for presumably technical
issues. The problem with this is, that a few years down the road, trust in corporate governance
is likely to again be tested by the recurrence of similar misdeeds. Only a decade before the
Enron cohort of frauds, for example, the United States was engulfed in the Saving and
Loans debacle, and the junk bond saga. The United Kingdom suffered a string of corporate
debacles in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the collapse of BCCI, the Maxwell
group of companies, and Polly Peck. More recently UK authorities were investigating the
pensions disaster at insurer Equitable Life. Clarke et al. (2003) discuss four decades of
corporate collapses in Australia, and elsewhere, commenting on the familiar patterns of
the observed cases and the subsequent legislative responses. Thailand, at the centre of the
1 The 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, rooted in dismal corporate governance, had preceded this of course. Entire
economies were pushed towards financial meltdown as the result of fraudulent or highly impudent management
of firms and a lack of supervision.
2 A small selection include the United Kingdom’s Company Law Reform White Paper of March 2005 (see also the
New Draft Clauses and Explanatory Material, September 2005); Italy’s 2004 Reform of Company Law; Germany’s
German Corporate Governance Code of 2002 (Also the 2003 Grundsatzkommission Corporate Governance. More
recently, the 2004 Draft Law of the Integrity of the Companies and the 2004 Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz); France’s
2003 Loi sur la Se´curite´ Financie`re (LSF); Australia’s Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform
and Corporate Disclosure) Bill 2003 (CLERP 9), and the Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) governance
regulations expected to take effect from 1 January 2006.
3 Banner (1997) argues that most major legislation regulating securities markets followed a sustained crash.
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1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, had a decade earlier bailed out much of its banking and
finance sector, only to repeat the exercise in the late 1990s.
The safeguards, rules and sanctions put in place after a wave of scandals often prove
inadequate in preventing the next cohort of frauds. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for example,
in large parts elaborates standards of existing law which had either not been fully enforced,
or were deemed not sufficiently visible (Cunningham, 2003). Ferrarini and Giudici (2005)
make a similar argument with regard to enforcement of corporate governance rules in
Italy, emphasizing that law on the books can be very different from its application and
enforcement. Clarke et al. (2003) argue that many standards-setting exercises fail to address
the core problems of corporate governance failures.
The recurrence of scandals points to a potential inadequacy of legislative responses, and
gives rise to the question whether more fundamental issues are being neglected. Typical
responses to corporate fraud, such as stronger penalties and additional layers of over-
sight/regulations, have been tried in the past with little success (Coffee, 2003a; Clarke
et al., 2003). Even strong enforcement of strict laws, while no doubt deterring some wrong-
doing, may not ensure the convergence of interests between principal and agent.4 Often
missing in the corporate governance discussion is a proper recognition of the effects of bias
in the decisions of monitors and gatekeepers.
These issues would also appear to be of relevance to another important, but often ignored
issue—namely the question to whom the corporation should ultimately be accountable. The
compatibility of shareholder maximization and long-term sustainability of the firm, and
indeed that of an entire economy, deserves a thorough discussion. Lazonick and O’Sullivan
(2000) and O’Sullivan (2000) identify the significant shortcomings of the shareholder max-
imization version of corporate governance, and question whether this in fact improves the
long-term performance of corporate enterprises.5 The rate of return on corporate stock may
be a poor measure of a firm’s performance, especially over longer periods, and also tends
to neglect the discussion on other stakeholders.6 The question to whom the corporation
should ultimately be accountable is an important one. However, it would seem that effec-
tive monitoring is required irrespective of the economic aims of a firm. If this interpretation
is correct, then it should be useful to have an adequate understanding of agent motivation
and choice behaviour within a corporate setting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines potential explanations for a breakdown
in corporate governance. The rational model of decision making and behavioural decision
4
‘Principal’ and ‘agent’ generally refers to the separation of ownership and control. The principal-agent problem
arises whenever a principal hires an agent to perform certain tasks, which highlights the necessity of aligning the
interests of these two parties (Smith, 1776). Berle and Means (1932) referred to the alignment of the interests
between management and the holders of the firm’s capital. More broadly defined, ‘principal’ need not necessarily
be equated with ownership (especially share ownership).
5 Further examples of research on the impact of different corporate governance structures on executive behavior
and/or organizational performance include Core et al. (1999) and Gompers et al. (2003).
6 Not that the Japanese model, supposedly being more supportive of long-term investment activities of corpo-
rations, necessarily provides a better guide to long-term firm performance. We cannot possibly do justice in this
short essay to the rich field of research that discusses the question whether an emphasis on ‘shareholder value’
allows for the perpetuation of societal prosperity. Engelen (2002) may serve as an introduction to some of these
issues. For an elaboration and critique of shareholder theory and practice, see O’Sullivan (2000).
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theory are introduced. Section 3 discusses the issue of earnings management, and suggests
that the rational actor assumption is at the very heart of controversies with regard to its
definition and measurement. Section 4 strongly cautions against the exclusive use of the
rational model of decision making in explaining agent behaviour in corporate governance.
We argue that this model’s interpretation of human choice behaviour provides an inadequate
understanding of crucial aspects of the choice behaviour of monitors and gatekeepers.
Section 5 concludes the discussion, and suggests that the use of psychologically more
realistic assumptions could result in better policy recommendations.
2. Some reasons for the breakdown in corporate governance
Williams (2004) identifies the colonization of accounting by what he calls positive eco-
nomic science (PES) as one possible cause for the frequent involvement of auditors in
corporate fraud. For Williams, the failure of accounting to prevent cases like Enron is a
moral issue. He notes that while the application of neoclassical economics to accounting
may have introduced an appearance of scientific rigour, this has not made accounting better
at preventing financial misrepresentation and fraud. It may possibly have changed the inter-
pretation of the accounting function from one with a strong emphasis on moral and legal
values, to one that relies on technical mechanisms (Williams, 2004). The role of accounting
in corporate governance may not be served by the adoption of seemingly scientific methods,
if the models on which these are based miss crucial elements of human nature.
An over-reliance on technical means to superficially verify compliance with given stan-
dards may come at the cost of seeking out and preventing earnings manipulations and
outright fraud. Revisions of accounting standards, procedural rules, and sanctions have
generally not improved the quality of accounting (Clarke et al., 2003). Too much trust
may be placed in developing mathematical models to estimate compliance with technical
guidelines such as the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Such reliance
may take accounting away from a moral and legal role, and exposes auditing to the danger
of irrelevance in the detection and prevention of fraud (Williams, 2004). One thing is for
certain, the accounting profession as a whole has failed in detecting and preventing the more
recent cases of corporate misdeeds.
Many of the assumptions regarding an auditor’s conduct are based on the rational model
of decision making, which has dominated and shaped the economic analysis of choice
for much of the past 50 years. Rational-choice theory assumes that the individual is a
self-interested expected utility maximizer, and has well-defined, stable and consistent pref-
erences or tastes. Further assumed is the strict application of these preferences to final
outcomes (but not to changes). The individual is deemed to apply exponential discounting
to future outcomes, and consistently adheres to a number of normative decision-making
rules (axioms). These rules include the perfect definition of a problem and knowledge of
all alternatives, the identification of all relevant criteria and their accurate weighting, and
finally the accurate computation and choice of the alternative with the highest expected
value (Friedman, 1957; Rabin, 2002).
Monitors and gatekeepers are typically assumed to be rational actors (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997; Prentice, 2000). Members of the board of directors and external auditors, for example,
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are thought to care about their reputation, future incomes, and their prospects in the job
market. This ideally disciplines their actions through a rational cost-benefit calculus. A
well-known United States judicial expression of the trust in reputation as a deterrent to
fraudulent behaviour was Judge Easterbrook’s position in the DiLeo v. Ernst Young case.7
The position held that it would be irrational (and preposterous) for an auditor to sacrifice
reputation for a negligible financial reward. Hence, the opinion held that the auditor could
not possibly have contributed to the fraud in question.
The presumed independence of an auditor may, however, be a myth (Briloff, 2004).
Ideally, the audit provides a reliable opinion on the true financial condition of the firm.
However, this ignores the fact that financial statements are drawn up by the senior man-
agement of a firm, to which auditors affix their signature. In doing so, the auditor gives the
financial statement an aura of respectability, which it may not deserve. In a similar vein,
Bazerman et al. (2002) claim that true auditor independence is near impossible as the result
of unconscious bias during the corporate auditing process, even where the auditor tries to
give a neutral opinion.
The assumption that people will actually behave in ways that maximize the mathematical
construct of expected utility is at odds with a large body of evidence from psychology and
behavioural research.8 In particular, the rational model of human decision making has been
criticised as being potentially misleading with regard to judgement and choice behaviour
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Simon, 1955; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Rabin, 2002).9
With the concept of ‘bounded rationality’, Simon (1955) provided an early alternative to
the strictly rational model. Subsequent findings from cognitive psychology and behavioural
research indicate that judgement, decision making and behaviour are not exclusively based
on logical reasoning. Instead, human judgement and choice is also subject to numerous
heuristics and cognitive biases (Fischhoff, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Nisbett
and Ross, 1980; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Bias may also be due to affect (Slovic
et al., 2002), visceral factors (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Schelling, 1984), and pressures
towards conformity with the group or authority (Asch, 1952; Janis, 1972). Divergence
from utility maximization over time adds a temporal dimension to this literature (Laibson,
1997; Schelling, 1978; Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981). These influences may lead to systematic
violations of the normative assumptions central to the rational model of decision making.
This challenges the view of the individual as a strictly rational actor, and suggests that
judgement and decision making may be better understood by investigating actual decision-
making processes.
Heuristics (mental shortcuts, or rules of thumb), for example, are useful simplifying
strategies that serve as mechanisms for quickly coping with complex situations. Generally,
heuristics provide good outcomes. On occasion, however, the very same heuristics which
7 DiLeo, 901 F.2d at 629. The aiding and abetting claim against the defendant auditor was discarded on the
grounds that it would have been irrational for the auditing partner to have acquiesced to the fraud for a gain smaller
than the potential loss from a ruined reputation.
8 Rabin (2002) provides an overview to the integration of psychology and economics in order to achieve a greater
degree of realism in the economic analysis of human choice behaviour. For a good introduction to behavioural
economics see Camerer et al. (2004).
9 Institutional economics has a long tradition of fundamental criticisms to some of the core assumptions of
mainstream economics, in particular with regard to the strict assumptions about rationality and utility maximization.
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allow for quick decision making, may cause faulty decision processes and bias (Nisbett
and Ross, 1980). Correcting for bias is an imperfect process (Kunda, 1990). Individuals
often continue to be subject to bias even when its operation is clearly demonstrated to
the individual, where the concept of bias is clearly understood, and where individuals
are explicitly instructed to avoid bias (Babcock et al., 1995). Bias typically enters at the
perception stage (when people form an opinion or judgement on a matter) and tends to reflect
the individual’s prior beliefs. Motivation can affect reasoning through a biased choice of
cognitive processes in order to reach the desired conclusions (Kunda, 1990).
A reliance on specific mental shortcuts can lead to systematic biases in judgement
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Assessments and decisions are frequently made on the
basis on how similar a given instance is to an earlier experience (‘Representativeness’,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), and on the ease of recollection of earlier experiences of
a similar type (‘Availability’, Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). At other times, judgment is
unduly influenced by first impressions. This can lead to situations where decision makers
focus on an initial value (an ‘anchor’), properly adjust their responses after receiving addi-
tional information, but typically do so insufficiently (‘Anchoring and Adjustment’, Slovic
and Lichtenstein, 1971). Historical precedent, the formulation of a problem, and random
information can result in an initial value or belief. Even extreme initial values can form
an anchor that individuals insufficiently adjust for when subsequent information allowing
updating becomes available (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
The literature on escalation of commitment shows that decision makers can become
over-committed to prior decisions, increasing allocations of resources to failing projects
(Staw, 1976). Individuals who confront negative consequences (on earlier views or actions)
tend to cognitively distort these to a more positively looking outcome. They also regularly
go to great lengths, including taking higher risk positions and hiding losses, in order to
avoid recognizing a loss (Bratton, 2002; Krawiec, 2000). This is further strengthened by
tendencies towards belief perseverance, the bias towards the status quo. Prior beliefs and
expectations filter and shape perception in a way as to support and preserve these earlier
held views (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). This can lead to self-serving attributions and motivated
reasoning, in order to avoid or reduce cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Individuals
tend to selectively filter out and overweight information that supports a view, and discount
evidence that contradicts their initial opinion (Lord et al., 1979). This reflects both the
selective attention and differential weighting of information of cognitive processes (e.g.
hypothesis confirmation; Snyder, 1984), and also motivational accounts such as cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Such biased assimilation of information typically leads
to attitude polarization, where a prior belief is reinforced (McHoskey, 1995).10
This bias also operates at the group level where it can be reinforced by social pressures.
It is uncomfortable to be the sole dissenting voice in a group. Groupthink describes a
situation where bright people in highly cohesive groups can make very bad decisions (Janis,
10 In an investigation on self-serving bias in auditing, King (2002) shows that social pressure to conform to group
norms can counter-balance self-serving bias. King (2002) criticizes Bazerman et al. (2002) who conclude that
auditors find it difficult to be independent due to unconscious bias. However, pressure to conform to norms may
also reinforce individual bias, or indeed induce it. Whether group pressure works to lessen or to enhance bias
would appear to depend on what norms the group emphasizes. See Janis (1972) and Staw (1976).
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1972). Typically observed are shared illusions, a sense of invulnerability, presumptions of
unanimity, self-censorship, and taboos against antagonizing members of group conspire
towards accepting the status quo. These combine to favour the strong discounting of, and
limited search for, alternative interpretations.
Research on corporate governance is increasingly turning to the findings of psychology
and behavioural economics for answers (Hanson and Kysar, 1999; Jolls et al., 1998; Prentice,
2000). Langevoort, for example, discusses reasons why securities brokers may exploit the
trust clients place in them (1996) and investigates why corporations commit securities
fraud (1998). More recently, he analyses sub-optimal monitoring (2001a) and examines the
tendency of board of directors to acquiesce to management decisions (2001b). Coffee (2001,
2002) elaborates the acquiescence rationale with regard to reputational intermediaries, and
defines conditions under which the watchdog role is likely to fail. In particular he asks under
what conditions a gatekeeper, such as an auditor, might deem it rational to reduce, rather
than preserve, reputational capital. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) dispute the independence of
directors in view of pressures from managerial power. These authors strongly question the
broad applicability of what they call “the optimal contacting approach”, where managers are
provided with efficient incentives to maximize firm value. A thorough analysis by Prentice
(2000) investigates whether it is always irrational for an auditor or an auditing firm to audit
recklessly or fraudulently.
Like everybody else, auditors are subject to behavioural and cognitive influences. They
tend to satisfice (Simon, 1955), rather than optimize. This may be inconsistent with, say,
Bayesian notions of probability, but is entirely rational from a cognitive cost-benefit per-
spective as it economizes on the cost of analysis (Asare and Wright, 1997). Auditors use
rules of thumb, or heuristics, to guide them, even when objective methods could be more
effective (McDaniel and Kinney, Jr., 1995). Auditors have been found to be subject to cog-
nitive dissonance and escalation of commitment (Weick, 1983). Waller and Felix (1984)
suggest that auditors display a strong tendency to seek and use confirmatory rather than
disconfirmatory evidence.
Memory is critically important to avoiding audit errors, and overconfidence in their mem-
ories can lead auditors to commit reckless errors by failing to check working papers before
reaching conclusions (Ramsay, 1994). General audit experience may not improve memory
(Johnson, 1994). Unfortunately, there seems to be little correlation between auditors’ con-
fidence in their ability to make going-concern judgments and their accuracy in doing so
(Kida, 1980). Auditors seem to display overconfidence in their abilities (Kent and Weber,
1998) and possibly also in their ethics (Cohen et al., 1995). Auditors are susceptible to a
number of other heuristics, including the representativeness heuristic (Kellogg and Kellogg,
1991; Smith and Kida, 1991; Uecker and Kinney, 1977), anchoring and adjustment (Bedard
and Wright, 1994; Bonner and Pennington, 1991; Hirst and Koonce, 1996), and availability
(Bonner and Pennington, 1991; Haynes and Kachelmeier, 1998).
Bias in the auditor/client relationship can severely compromise the independence of an
external audit (Bazerman et al., 2002). There is some evidence that legislators and standard
setters are starting to recognize bias as a much more serious problem than might previously
have been assumed. The 2002 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 99) by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, for example, highlights the persistence
of bias in auditing. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also goes some way in mitigating bias in
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auditing by, for e.g., making rotation mandatory, and prohibiting the provision of certain
services. However, the punitive legislation incorporated in the Act is evidence of a long-
established, but possibly ineffective, tradition of raising the cost of crime. Of course, there
should be penalties for breaking the rules, but past experience shows how easily individuals
‘rationalize’ such risks away. Regulations that merely serve up more of the same, higher
fines, stronger penalties and the like, have failed in the past and it is difficult to see why
they should work now.
Deviations from the outcomes predicted by the rational model of decision making are also
relevant to research on the concept, detection and measurement of earnings management.
The following section will argue that the numerical measures typically used in efforts to
detect and measure earnings management are of dubious value.
3. Earnings management
The issue of earnings management is as important as it is controversial. Irregularities in
the financial statements are frequently at the center of corporate scandals. Yet earnings man-
agement can occur without violating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or
breaching relevant laws, and hence does necessarily involve fraud in the legal sense.11 The
controversy does not end here, as the detection and measurement of earnings management
is also a matter of considerable discussion (Dechow et al., 2003). There does not even seem
to exist a uniform definition of earnings management in the academic literature. Nor is there
any agreement in the literature on whether earnings management is widespread or has a
large effect on aggregate reported earnings.
The primary focus of financial reporting is to provide “information about an enterprise’s
performance by measures of earnings and its components” (FASB, 1978, SFAC 1, para.
43).12 Thus, financial reports can provide important information about the economic per-
formance of a firm and serve as a guide to a firm’s value. In contrast, the wide scope of
managerial judgement inherent to existing accounting rules, enables managers to report firm
performance in ways that can obscure the firm’s true financial situation. Empirical research
on corporate governance frequently investigates quantifiable relationships between vari-
ous measures of corporate performance and specific remedies to agency problems. These
include the number and independence of directors on a company board or board commit-
tees, and the independence of external auditors (DaDalt et al., 2003; Jones, 1991; Peasnell et
al., 2000).It is conceivable that earnings management could play a positive role. Managers
might, for example, manage earnings to convey privileged information to the market (Healy
and Palepu, 1993), or to reduce political costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Unidentified
earnings management has also been found to enjoy lower capital costs (Dechow et al., 1995),
with the potential to benefit selected shareholders, at least in the short run. Finally, managers
11 Jiambalvo (1996) discusses a range of forms of earnings management. Holthausen et al. (1995) discuss actions
including changes in expenditures on research and development, and capital expenditures, as means of earnings
manipulations.
12 Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information, Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1,
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1978).
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and existing shareholders may benefit from manipulation of (new) investors’ perceptions
of the firm’s value (Kellogg and Kellogg, 1991). Such potentially more benign forms of
earnings management come at the cost, however, of increasing the risk that the practice
mutates into a more malicious form.
Earnings management is typically inferred if actual earnings differ from expected earn-
ings in the direction favoured by the identified incentive (Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991).
One typical methodology estimates earnings before any earnings management is deemed
to have occurred, comparing this with actually reported earnings. This approach defines
accruals as the difference between earnings and cash flows from operations, decomposing
total accruals into expected (or non-discretionary) accruals and abnormal (or discretionary)
accruals. The rationale for accrual accounting is the attempt to match costs with related
revenues, to better reflect underlying economic performance (Statement of Accounting
Concepts No. 1, FASB, 1978, para. 44). As such, the advantage of accruals based account-
ing should be the minimization of noise in the cash flow of a firm (Dechow, 1994). This
can make financial data more meaningful, but introduces judgement and assumptions with
regard to future cash flows. Earnings are subject to future revisions if actual cash flows dif-
fer from earlier projections. Using accruals accounting provides senior management with
opportunities for earnings management. As a result, accruals are prone to both deliberate
and unintentional error, which introduces noise to this measure of financial performance.
Sloan (1996) suggests that accruals are less persistent than cash flow, due to the greater
subjectivity of accruals. The magnitude of this error, in turn, reduces the informational
benefit of accruals (Palepu et al., 2000). High levels of accruals may indicate low-quality,
i.e. non-persistent-earnings (Dechow and Dichev, 2002). Richardson et al. (2004b) show
that less reliable categories of accruals lead to lower earnings persistence.
Accrual prediction models generally use the assumption that forecast errors represent
earnings management (DaDalt et al., 2003; Dechow, 1994; Jones, 1991; Peasnell et al.,
2000).13 A number of proxies and control variables are used to distinguish between the
normal accrual needs of the firm and abnormal accruals, and to adjust for business cycle
patterns. The residual (unexplained or unexpected) component of total accruals is then inter-
preted as evidence of earnings management.14 Event-specific earnings management studies
typically test the mean abnormal accruals across event firms and test whether the mean is
significantly different from zero. A mean significantly different from zero is interpreted as
being consistent with earnings management. The literature includes studies on the relative
value relevance of cash flows versus accruals (Dechow, 1994; Holthausen and Watts, 2001;
Rayburn, 1986; Wilson, 1987); the pricing of discretionary versus nondiscretionary accruals
(Guay et al., 1996); tests of earnings management and income smoothing (DeAngelo, 1986;
Dechow et al., 1995; Jones, 1991); and the market’s mispricing of accruals (Bradshaw et
al., 2001; Sloan, 1996; Hribar and Collins, 2002; Richardson et al., 2004a).
The accuracy of popular accruals prediction models in detecting earnings management
has repeatedly been questioned.15 It is recognized that existing techniques for measuring
13 See Thomas and Zhang (2000) for a comparison of accrual prediction models.
14 A somewhat simpler approach looks at changes in total accruals as a proxy for unexpected accruals.
15 See in particular Dechow et al. (1995), for a detailed discussion of strengths and weaknesses of several
competing models.
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earnings management tend to misclassify some nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary
(Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Dechow et al., 1998; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). In general,
accruals prediction models estimate discretionary accruals with considerable imprecision
(Dechow et al., 1995; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Thomas and Zhang, 2000).16 The misclas-
sification of nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary, and the imprecision in estimating
discretionary accruals, can lead to the false detection of earnings management (Dechow
et al., 1998). Guay et al. (1996) re-examine the models earlier investigated by Dechow et
al. (1995), and find that all models under investigation (e.g. DeAngelo, 1986; Jones, 1991)
estimate discretionary accruals imprecisely. Controlling for major unusual accruals events
(e.g. mergers and acquisitions) may lead to a more refined measure of abnormal accruals,
but potentially serious estimation errors remain (Bernard and Skinner, 1996; Hribar and
Collins, 2002).
An alternative approach assesses attributes in the distribution of earnings in large samples
as evidence consistent with earnings management (Degeorge et al., 1999; Dechow and
Skinner, 2000; Myers and Skinner, 2002).17 This approach tries to avoid the problems
associated with the direct measurement of accruals, and concentrates instead on differences
in earnings distribution patterns. Examples of this work include Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997), who find a high incidence of earnings management in order to avoid small annual
losses and earnings decreases. Bartov et al. (2002) note an increase in the percentage of
firms that meet or beat analysts’ estimates for the period 1983–1997. Burgstahler and Eames
(1998) and Degeorge et al. (1999) find an unusually high percentage of zero and small
positive earnings surprises. Small reported losses and small declines in reported losses have
been found to be unusually rare (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Hayn, 1995). Degeorge
et al. (1999) find evidence for earnings management being used to meet or beat a simple
hierarchy of performance thresholds: First try to avoid reporting losses, then report increases
in quarterly earnings, and finally attempt to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts. Myers and
Skinner (2002) suggest that executives may engage in earnings management in order to
maintain a smooth growth history, and to avoid the severe declines in market valuations
when such a string is broken.18
The difficulty in detecting earnings management and the general failure of predicting it,
may be an indication of the potential inappropriateness of the predominant use of positive
economic methodology in accounting (Williams, 2004). Despite the relative ease of pro-
ducing scholarly papers based on empirical analysis of corporate data, this has not resulted
16 Specifically, Dechow et al. (1995) find that all the models under investigation produced reasonably well-
specified tests, but that the power of these tests was low for earnings management of fairly high levels of
manipulation (5% of assets). Further, application to firms, which experience extreme financial performance lead to
mis-specified tests for all models. Dechow et al. (2000) pick up on the difficulties of trying to detect earnings man-
agement through the focus on management’s use of discretional accruals. These authors argue that the identification
of firms engaging in earnings management would benefit from concentrating on managerial incentives.
17 Dechow et al. (2000) point to the trade-off this approach makes vis-a`-vis to research using discretionary
accruals methods. While discretionary accruals models tend to lack power and tend to use small sample sizes,
studies on the attributes of earnings distributions (e.g. see Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) crucially depends on the
assumption that the detected empirical irregularities are evidence of earnings management.
18
“. . . the existence of many consecutive quarters of growth in earnings-per-share resulting from accruals (rather
than from cash flows) is prima facie evidence of earnings management” (p. 1).
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in successes when directed at the prediction of earnings management and financial fraud.
The preceding sentence presumes a link between earnings management and fraud, which
needs some clarification. Earnings management can encompass a broad range of actions that
affect reported earnings, not all of them constituting fraud. Accounting based management
of financial reports can be within Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and
also include practices that clearly violate GAAP. Yet, while there is considerable disagree-
ment in the literature on the damage caused by earnings management, fraudulent statements
typically are the most costly form of occupational fraud (Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners, 2002, 2004).19 Cases of massive corporate fraud tend to center on financial
statement manipulations (Coffee, 2003b). It is the potential of earnings management to
obscure the true financial state of the firm which gives cause for concern (Levitt, 1998).
The detection and measurement of earnings management remains problematic. Questions
on the magnitude and frequency of earnings management and its impact on the allocation
of resources in the economy have not been settled with great confidence.20 Research has
generally failed to provide significant evidence of systematic attempts to manage earnings,
despite the apparent significance of this problem (Dechow et al., 1995, 2003; Healy and
Wahlen, 1999; Larcker et al., 2005).21 If earnings management is widespread, significant,
and key to corporate financial fraud, then the difficulty in detection and measurement is
hardly encouraging. Getting around this problem may require some rethinking with regard
to the causes and motives for earnings management. In a partial answer, Dechow and Skinner
(2000) suggest that current research methodologies are not very efficient at identifying
earnings management. These authors add that research has focused on particular managerial
incentives that are not overly useful in identifying earnings management behaviour.
In light of the definitional issues, it is hardly surprising that the earnings management
literature runs into measurement issues. Strictly numerical indicators for measuring the
quality of corporate governance have been found lacking in general (Larcker et al., 2005).
A more useful approach for research might be to concentrate on managers’ incentives to
manage earnings, and on the incentives and motivations of their monitors/gatekeepers to
acquiesce. Some of the influences on agent judgement and decision making have already
been introduced in previous sections. The following section further develops this argument.
4. Critique on using rational-choice concepts in corporate governance
We question a naı¨ve application of the rational choice model of decision making to the
behaviour of agents in a corporate governance setting. There is nothing wrong, per se, with
the theoretical propositions of the model. What should be objectionable, however, is the
19 For a discussion of the disparity in views on this topic, see Dechow and Skinner (2000).
20 This is in addition to the question whether earnings management is a problem of sufficient severity to justify
such a wide discussion. See Denis (2001) for an insight to the breath of the literature.
21 Larcker et al. (2005) show the limited use of strictly numerical tools and benchmarks in assessments of
managerial conduct. These authors examined the relationship between a comprehensive set of corporate governance
measures and firm performance, and find very limited explanatory power of the typical structural indicators of
corporate governance used in academic research for explaining managerial behaviour and firm performance.
Larcker et al. suggest instead the use of psychological measures in judging managerial conduct.
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assumption that this model is descriptively valid and synonymous with rational behaviour.
Of relevance to this essay is the (mostly) unquestioned adoption of accounting of this
model of human judgement and choice. One implication of this adoption is the assumption
of conscious corruption as the main problem in cases of financial fraud where auditor
involvement is alleged. This would also seem to apply to much of the legislation introduced
in response to the more recent scandals. As a result, existing and proposed legislative
efforts mainly aim at preventing or minimising fraudulent intentions and penalizing legal
transgressions. Less attention is focused on the issue of subconscious bias in the judgement
and decision-making process of monitors and gatekeepers.
This paper does not propose to focus on the deficiencies of a particular individual in
management, the board, or the external audit team. This would obscure the systematic
problems that underlie the frequency of corporate scandals (Clarke et al., 2003; Langevoort,
2003). Any conclusion, which merely places blame on the individual(s) involved, without
looking at the deeper causes behind the frauds, seriously misses the point. It also condemns
itself to reliving another cycle of scandals just a few years down the road (Coffee, 2003b).
Instead, we suggest taking a closer look at decision making within corporate governance.
Decisions in corporate governance are often made at the individual level. While the legal
and regulatory environment sets the framework within which choices are made, decisions
within corporate settings ultimately come down to the individual. Policy recommendations,
laws and rules might be more effective if we have a better understanding of how individuals
react to a particular risk/reward system.
There is also a clear political aspect in the latest scandals. Changes to the system of
corporate governance were major contributors to the latest wave of corporate misconduct.
Enron, for one, was highly successful in lobbying for a legal and regulatory environment that
suited its immediate objectives. Enron’s exemption from oversight in trading certain energy
related derivatives, and the ease with which it was able to set up special purpose vehicles,
are potential examples of regulatory failure (Coffee, 2003a). Developments that weakened
the corporate governance system in the 1990s (as far as the US is concerned) include
those that changed the incentives of senior executives and auditors. Other developments
frequently mentioned in the literature include the rise equity-based compensation of senior
management and the relaxation of the rules on stock option exercise. Also of importance
are the increasing provision of consulting services by auditing firms, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.
The literature on the changing regulatory environment is an important one, and provides
one crucial piece to the puzzle (see Coffee, 2003a, 2003b, for a detailed analysis of the
changes in the regulatory environment).
It is useful to recall that an economist’s model is an abstract simplification of the real
world. We have long been taught that assumptions, in general, do not need to be overly
valid or realistic as long as the model has reasonably predictive powers (Friedman, 1957).
A real and pervasive danger in the use of abstract modelling, however, is to take a simplified
theoretical construct and assume that this represents reality. Calabresi and Melamed (1972,
p. 1128) commented on this danger by noting that:
“Framework or model building has two short-comings: The first is that models can
be mistaken for the total view of phenomena, like legal relationships which are too
O. Marnet / Critical Perspectives on Accounting 18 (2007) 191–210 203
complex to be painted in any one picture. The second is that models generate boxes
into which one then feels compelled to force situations which do not truly fit.”
With all its advantages, including parsimony and ease of econometric modelling, it has
never been claimed by its proponents that the rational actor model represents how people
actually act or that its assumptions are highly realistic. Von Neumann and Morgenstern
certainly did not make such a claim in their seminal 1944 article, which forms one of the
foundations of rational-choice theory.
Rational choice theory may provide an inadequate understanding of crucial aspects of
decision making. Primarily, this model would appear inadequate in describing the processes
by which judgements and decisions are made, and how new information is incorporated
to update prior beliefs. This may require law and economics scholars “to acknowledge
that in some circumstances actual policy decisions should not be based on the assumption
that people are rational.” (Arlen, 1998, p. 1768). In addition, the assumption of fixed,
well-ordered preferences and perfect information assimilation seem empirically inadequate
(Rabin, 2002). It also fails to incorporate the effects of situational and cultural influences
on decision making (Archer and Tritter, 2000). Given these shortcomings, it is perhaps not
surprising that economists and legal scholars increasingly emphasize an interpretation of
rationality that accepts the complexity of human decision making.22
Failures in corporate governance appear to occur far more frequently than the presum-
ably high standards of corporate governance in countries with a well-developed system of
property rights, law and regulatory agencies might lead us to expect (Turnbull, 2000). In
many cases the affected companies issued healthy audit reports just prior to their collapse.
This has created an academic literature on an “audit expectation gap”, which tries to partially
absolve the accounting profession from responsibility in cases of corporate fraud (Guthrie,
1992; Walker, 1991). Under this interpretation, the auditor is seen to be of only secondary
importance in the corporate governance setting (Young, 2001). Against this, we would like
to ask what, then, is the value of having external audits?
We suggest that the external audit, nonetheless, remains an important component of cor-
porate governance. It is, however, at the time to discard, or at least substantially modify,
some assumptions on individual choice making which have guided the accounting profes-
sion over the past 40 years. An inflexible reliance of economic theory on the rational model
of decision making may lead to over-confidence with regard to the feasibility of indepen-
dence of external auditors. It is suggested, instead, to base assumptions on decision-making
behaviour on psychologically more realistic foundations. Research on decision theory (e.g.
Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999), managerial power (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003), and auditor
independence (Bazerman et al., 2002) show that the rational model of decision making falls
short in explaining real world decision behaviour (see also Jolls et al., 1998; Hanson and
Kysar, 1999; Posner, 2003; Parisi and Smith, 2005). The accounting literature has recently
re-joined the call for a critical review of the applicability of rational choice theory to auditing
and accounting (Briloff, 2004; Williams, 2004).
As already noted, arguments for accounting reform are frequently based on the assump-
tion that auditors are intentionally biased. In contrast, Bazerman et al. (2002) show that a
22 See, e.g. Jolls et al. (1998).
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more fundamental challenge to auditor independence may result from the intrusion of unin-
tentional bias. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 2002a)
was aware of the potential for bias when it stated in 1988 that: “In the performance of any
professional service, a member shall maintain integrity, shall be free of conflicts of interest,
and shall not knowingly misrepresent facts or subordinate his or her judgment to others”.23
The underlying assumption, at the time, still being that the auditing process can be impartial
and free of bias, presumably if the auditor only ‘watches out’ for this. Yet, auditors still
missed what was going on at Enron and Parmalat, for example.
In the more recent Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 99, AICPA, 2002b),
AICPA recognized bias to be a much more persistent problem. SAS 99 reminds auditors
that they need to overcome natural tendencies-such as an overconfidence in client state-
ments and suggests an audit be approached with a sceptical attitude and questioning mind.
A ‘fraud triangle’ explicitly outlines the incentives, opportunities and rationalizations when
a fraud is being committed. A detailed set of procedures is aimed at increasing the audi-
tor’s ability to identify and detect fraud. Steps include communication among engagement
partners, with management and the audit committee about the risk of material misstate-
ment, with particular reference to fraud. Consideration of fraud risk factors, accounting
estimates for biases, and significant unusual transactions are specifically highlighted. This
intuitive approach reflects a comprehensive understanding of the potential for bias in the
auditor-client relationship. SAS 99 focuses on new responsibilities and new procedures
aimed at improving the likelihood that auditors detect material misstatements. As such, it
would appear to be a step in the right direction. How successful SAS 99 will be in actually
countering the inevitable bias introduced by the close client/auditor working relationship
remains, of course, a matter for future investigation.
Rational choice models of human decision making and conventional numeric measures
are unlikely to be a panacea for corporate collapse. This argument extends to the mea-
surement and detection of earnings management. Echoing this sentiment, Larcker et al.
(2005), suggest that the structural indicators of corporate governance typically used in aca-
demic research are very limited guides to managerial behaviour and firm performance.
This underlines the difficulties in measuring corporate governance and suggests that the
typical indicators are based on questionable empirical foundations. Enron, as mentioned,
scored high on some typical governance metrics (e.g. the separation of the roles of CEO
and President; the use of outside directors), and yet failed miserably.
The work on abnormal accruals by Sloan (1996), Palepu et al. (2000), Dechow and Dichev
(2002), and Richardson et al. (2004b), shows that specific numeric metrics can still be useful
warning signs for impending financial difficulties. Assessing attributes in the distribution of
earnings in large samples can provide further evidence consistent with earnings management
(Degeorge et al., 1999; Dechow and Skinner, 2000; Myers and Skinner, 2002). The earnings
benchmarks hierarchy identified by Degeorge et al. (1999) may provide an additional guide.
The same goes for long periods of smooth earnings growth, which may be an indication of
efforts to avoid the severe declines in market valuations when such a string is broken (Myers
and Skinner, 2002). Callen et al. (2002) find that restating firms tend to have deteriorating
23 AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, Rule 102—Integrity and Objectivity, adopted 12 January 1988, 2002a
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financial performance in the period around the restatement. This identifies inferior financial
performance as an additional motivator for aggressive reporting practices of management.
Such metrics may not be foolproof, but they can serve as red flags to potential troubles.
However, there is really no alternative to closely examining the financial statements of each
individual firm (Larcker et al., 2005). Investors must bear in mind that managers have an
incentive to improve the scores of the very benchmarks on which markets focus. Managers
are also very good in discovering new instruments, which void the usefulness of existing
benchmarks. Finally, users of financial data should be aware of their own biases when
interpreting this information, especially the tendency to see what they want to see.
5. Conclusion
A large body of research comments on important aspects of the problem of minimiz-
ing the conflicts between principal and agent. However, until fairly recently, the effects of
human psychology on judgement and choice behaviour received somewhat less attention
in the standard debate on corporate governance. Often ignored, or dismissed as irrelevant,
were issues of cognition, perception, heuristics, bias, emotion and affect. This is somewhat
odd, as economics and accounting should be concerned with the response of individuals to
incentives. It must be valid to ask whether the rational model of decision making is a viable
description of how individuals form judgements and make decisions in a corporate environ-
ment. This is of particular relevance to the way accounting and auditing are being taught and
conducted. It would also seem of importance to legislation in response to corporate scandals.
A time-honoured response to major corporate failures is the establishment of committees
of inquiry, changes in legislation, and the recommendation of new laws and codes of best
practice. These steps typically react post-hoc to problems, and new waves of corporate
debacles tend to shake public confidence in the existing system of corporate governance
just a few years later. This, yet again, leads to questions about the adequacy of existing rules,
more hearings, reports and proposals for new rules and regulations. The recurrence of waves
of fraud should prompt the question whether some crucial elements in human nature are
being missed in the standard approach to the agency problem. An over-reliance of legal and
economic theory on the rational model of choice behaviour may yield an over-confidence
with regard to the feasibility of independence of directors and external auditors. This may
also result in over-confidence in the deterrence value of rules and legislation.
There is a growing awareness of the importance of a better understanding of human
decision making than is provided by the neo-classical rational choice model alone. Choice
behaviour is not solely based on logical reasoning, but is also influenced by biases, schemata,
framing, and cognitive and judgmental heuristics (Jolls et al., 1998; Prentice, 2000; Rabin,
2002). If these insights are useful in describing how executive managers and their monitors
behave, this would seriously question the efficacy of existing rules and regulations on corpo-
rate governance, as these strongly rely on rational actors. At the very least, this would suggest
the need for significant modifications to the monitoring model of corporate governance.
What is needed is a better understanding of what drives managerial and monitor conduct.
One might finally ask whether massive corporate debacles can happen again, and the
sober conclusion is that they can and will. In fact, this is inevitable as long as the inclusion
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of crucial features of human nature is being resisted in efforts to keep models of choice
behaviour simple. Simple and elegant, unfortunately, do not translate into correct or rele-
vant. Dismissing modifications to models that improve psychological realism is not helpful
to economics, or to the accounting profession (both practitioners and scholars). A better
understanding of how individuals behave in the real world may at the very least improve
our chances of preventing future corporate disasters.
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